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THE EVOLUTION OF SAME-SEX SEXUAL
HARASSMENT LAW: A CRITICAL
EXAMINATION OF THE LATEST




The law of sexual harassment has proved to be one of the
fastest evolving areas of law in the United States over the past
two decades.1 Sexual harassment was not recognized as a legiti-
mate cause of action until the 1970s,2 even though Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provided that "[iut shall be an unlaw-
ful employment practice for an employer.., to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's... sex."3
In 1976, sexual harassment was finally recognized as a valid
cause of action under Title VII in cases involving economic loss or
tangible job-related detriment resulting from workplace sexual
harassment.4 A cause of action was also subsequently recognized
* LL.B. (University of Ghana); LL.M., Ph.D. (University of London); LL.M.
(Georgetown). Member of the New York and Virginia Bars, and Professor of Busi-
ness Law at Norfolk State University, Norfolk, Virginia. He is admitted to practice
before the United States Supreme Court, and is listed in Who's Who in American
Law. He is the author of WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW: PRINCIPLES,
LANDMARK DEVELOPMENTS, AND FRAMEWORK FOR EFFECTIVE RISK MANAGEMENT
(1999).
1 See Baker v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 951 F. Supp. 953, 960 (E.D.
Wash. 1996) (noting that "[slexual harassment is a fast-evolving theory of liability");
Carol Stocker, Experts, Readers Disagree, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 24, 1991, at 73 (not-
ing how new cases are constantly expanding definitions of sexual harassment); see
also Francis Achampong, A Critical Analysis of the Two-Pronged Perspective for
Viewing a Hostile Environment in Sexual Harassment Cases, 24 SW. U. L. REV. 303
(1995).
2 See David Lauter & Stuart Silverstein, When Sex Talk Goes Too Far, LA.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 1991, at Al; see also Achampong, supra note 1, at 303.
3 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
4 See Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd and remanded on
other grounds, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that a male supervisor who
had retaliated against a female worker for denying his sexual advances was liable
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in cases where, although there was no job detriment, a hostile
working environment had resulted from sexual harassment. As a
result, the term "sexual harassment" began to appear in Ameri-
can nomenclature in 1981. 5 District courts resisted the cogni-
zability of recognizing sexual harassment suits under Title VII
fearing that the cases would lead down a "slippery slope."6 Al-
ternatively, some courts feared that recognition of a cause of ac-
tion for sexual harassment would encourage federal lawsuits7
and force the courts to become interpreters of actions in the
workplace,8 thereby creating a demand for 4,000 federal judges
instead of 400. 9
In 1981, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC"), which had long recognized sexual harassment as a
form of sex discrimination under Title VII, amended its Guide-
lines on Discrimination Because of Sex ("Guidelines") to add a
section expressly dealing with sexual harassment.10 Section
for sexual harassment in violation of Title VII); see also Chamberlin v. 101-Realty
Inc., 915 F.2d 777, 783 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that when tangible aspects of em-
ployment are affected by sexual harassment, a violation of Title VII may occur);
Achampong, supra note 1, at 303.
5 See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (recognizing a hostile
environment as a violation of Title VII, and holding the emotional and psychological
work environment to constitute "conditions of employment"); see also Sharon L. Os-
wald & William L. Woerner, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A View Through
the Eyes of the Courts, 41 LAB. L.J. 786, 788 (1990) (noting that the use of the term
"sexual harassment" began in 1981).
6 See B. Glenn George, The Back Door: Legitimizing Sexual Harassment Claims,
73 B.U. L. REV. 1, 11 (1993) (noting that sexual harassment behaviors were not de-
fined and therefore courts feared that they would be inundated with suits due to this
ambiguity).
7See Come v. Baush & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) (stat-
ing that liability under Title VII in the sexual harassment context would increase
the potential for federal lawsuits whenever two employees made sexual or amorous
comments or actions toward one another), vacated without op., 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir.
1977).
8 See Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (realizing the
difficulty that may arise in sexual harassment suits because subtle actions and flir-
tations could be considered violations, and noting that these actions are usually part
of everyday interactions between males and females), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir.
1979).
9 See Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 557 (D.N.J.
1976) (stressing that if sexual harassment was recognized in the employment con-
text, any social interaction could lead to a claim if problems in that relationship
arose), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
10 See EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 615.2(a) (1998).
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1604.11(a) of the Guidelines defined sexual harassment as fol-
lows:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute
sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made
either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individ-
ual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct
by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions
affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work per-
formance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment 11
This Guideline recognized two forms of workplace sexual
harassment: quid pro quo,12 and hostile environment sexual har-
assment.13
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court, in Meritor Sav-
ings Bank v. Vinson,14 recognized a 'hostile environment" as a
valid cause of action under Title VII. 15 The Meritor Savings
Bank court held that a plaintiff may recover for a hostile envi-
ronment if she, or he,16 shows that unwelcome sexual conduct
based on gender was "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the
1 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1998).
12 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(l)-(2) (describing quid pro quo sexual harassment);
see also Heyne v. Caruso, 69 F.3d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that quid pro
quo sexual harassment is established when the complainant shows "that an individ-
ual 'explicitly or implicitly condition[ed] a job, a job benefit, or the absence of a job
detriment, upon an employee's acceptance of sexual conduct' ") (quoting Nichols v.
Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 1994)).
13 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (describing hostile environment sexual harass-
ment); see also Gallant v. Board of Trustees, 997 F. Supp. 1231, 1234 (N.D. Cal.
1998) (holding that in a hostile environment requests and conduct of a sexual nature
are unwelcome and severe).
14 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
Is See id. at 73. The district court had ruled against the plaintiff because it
found that her relationship with her supervisor, with whom she had slept with on
about 40 to 50 occasions for fear of losing her job, was voluntary. See id. at 60-61.
The Supreme Court held that the issue was not the voluntariness of the relation-
ship, but whether the supervisors conduct was welcome. See id. at 68.
16 The prohibition against sex discrimination protects "any individual." See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(a) (1994). The EEOC states that"[a] man as well as a woman may
be the victim of sexual harassment, and a woman as well as a man may be the har-
asser." EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 615.2(b)(1) (1998); see also Yeary v. Goodwill
Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that Title VI's pro-
hibition applies "equally to men and women") (relying on Newport News Shipbuild-
ing & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 676 (1983)).
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conditions of... employment and create an abusive working en-
vironment.' "17
In its Guidelines, the EEOC also stated:
An employer may also be responsible for the acts of non-
employees, with respect to sexual harassment of employees in
the workplace, where the employer (or its agents or supervisory
employees) knows or should have known of the conduct and fails
to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. In re-
viewing these cases the Commission will consider the extent of
the employer's control and any other legal responsibility which
the employer may have with respect to the conduct of such non-
employees.' 8
In accordance with this Guideline, the law of workplace sex-
ual harassment evolved in the courts to encompass third party
harassment. Two variants of third party harassment were rec-
ognized: (1) where the employer's own job requirements, such as
a dress code, lead to sexual harassment by a third party;19 and (2)
where independently of any employer policy, the employer
knows, or should know of third party harassment of employees,
yet takes no remedial action that is within its control.20
The first variant was recognized in EEOC v. Sage Realty
Corp.,21 where the employer required its female lobby attendants
17 Meritor Sa. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682
F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)). The court refused to impose strict liability, allowing
agency principles to determine liability in hostile environment cases involving a su-
pervisor. See id. at 70.
18 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (1994).
19 See EEOC v. Newtown Inn Assocs., 647 F. Supp. 957, 958 (E.D. Va. 1986)
(holding an employer liable for a Title VII violation as a result of requiring wait-
resses to don revealing outfits and flirt with customers in a provocative manner);
EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding a build-
ing manager liable for a sexual discrimination violation after requiring a lobby at-
tendant to wear a uniform which caused her to be sexually harassed); Marentette v.
Michigan Host, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 909, 912 (E.S. Mich. 1980) (stating that requiring
female waitresses to wear sexually provocative uniforms may violate Title VII).
20 See Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024, 1029-30 (D. Nev.
1992) (holding an employer liable for acts of third parties where the employer did
not assist an employee blackjack dealer after complaints were made regarding abuse
by customers); Magnuson v. Peak Technical Servs., 808 F. Supp. 500, 513 (E.D. Va.
1992) (holding an automobile manufacturer liable for sexual harassment of a repre-
sentative employee); EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 609 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (noting that the fact that the building manager did not respond to the em-
ployee's complaints aided in the court's determination that a cause of action existed).
21 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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to wear a uniform, 22 making the plaintiff the target of sexual
propositions as a result of the sexually revealing nature of the
uniform.23 The employer failed to take remedial action despite
the employee's complaints and ultimately fired her.24 The court
held that the employer violated Title VII when it fired the plain-
tiff for refusing to wear the uniform.25 The plaintiff was awarded
back pay for wrongful discharge.26
The second variant was recognized in Magnuson v. Peak
Technical Services,27 where the court was faced with the issue of
whether a court could find an employer liable for sexual harass-
ment by non-employees under Title VII. The court ultimately
held that an employer could be liable if it had knowledge of the
harassment and, nonetheless, failed to take remedial action.28
The next significant stage in the evolution of workplace sex-
ual harassment law was the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1991,29 which extended the protections of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 196430 to include previously exempt federal employ-
ees, such as presidential appointees and employees of the Sen-
2 See id. at 604.
2 See id. at 605.
24 See id. at 607.
2 See id. at 607-08.
26 See id. at 613; see also Marentette v. Michigan Host, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 909,
912 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (stating "that a sexually provocative dress code imposed as a
condition of employment which subjects persons to sexual harassment could well
violate the true spirit and the literal language of Title VII"). Furthermore, the
EEOC's Compliance Manual on grooming standards states that merely requiring
females to "wear sexually provocative uniforms" is evidence of sexual harassment in
some cases. EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 619.4(a) (1998).
27 808 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Va. 1992).
28 See id. at 513. It denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment. See
id. at 514. A decade earlier in an administrative decision, the EEOC found an em-
ployer, who owned a restaurant, liable for sexual harassment of an employee by a
customer who was a close friend of the owner. The owner had failed to take correc-
tive action despite the employee's complaints, and eventually fired her for threaten-
ing legal action. See id. at 513. See generally Francis Achampong, Third Party Har-
assment and Other Significant Recent Developments in Sexual Harassment Law: A
Discussion of the Latest Developments in Workplace Sexual Harassment Litigation,
28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 631 (1994) (discussing sexual harassment in the workplace
and liability for the employer where knowledge exists or should exist and no action
is subsequently taken by the employer).
29 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
30 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1994).
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ate,31 as well as certain employees of states or their political sub-
divisions who were not previously covered.3 2
Not only did it widen the scope of protected employees, it
also expanded the existing remedies under Title VII, ranging
from injunctive relief (including reinstatement, back pay, lost
benefits, attorney's fees, certain litigation costs, and interest)33 to
compensatory damages for intentional discrimination (including
damages for emotional pain, suffering, mental anguish, and loss
of enjoyment of life), and punitive damages in cases where the
employer engaged in discrimination which was malicious or
recklessly indifferent to the employee's civil rights.3 4  The
amount of both compensatory and punitive damages cannot ex-
ceed (1) $50,000 for employers with 15 to 100 employees; (2)
$100,000 for employer with 101 to 200 employees; (3) $200,000
for employers with 201 to 500 employees; and (4) $300,000 for
employers with more than 500 employees.3 5
The 1991 Act gave a plaintiff suing for damages the right to
a jury trial36 and expert fees.3 7 In mixed motives cases where the
employer would have made the same decision absent the dis-
criminatory factors, the plaintiff can only recover declaratory and
injunctive relief, and attorney's fees and costs, but not damages,
reinstatement, hiring, back pay, or promotion.38
The next major development was the acceptance by courts
that a single event could result in a hostile environment if seri-
ous enough. In King v. Board of Regents of the University of Wis-
consin System, 3 9 the Seventh Circuit accepted the possibility that
one event could result in a hostile environment. Then in Barrett
v. Omaha National Bank,40 where the harasser touched the
31 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1994).
32 For example, members of the staff of elected state officials, persons on their
policy making staff, or advisers who advise elected state officials on the exercise of
their official powers. See 2 U.S.C. § 1220 (1994).
33 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994).
34 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1994).
35 See id.
36 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (1994).
37 See id.
38 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(b) (1994).
39 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that although a single act may be
enough to create a hostile work environment, the strength of the claim is affected by
the number and intensity of the incidents).
40 584 F. Supp. 22, 30 (D. Neb. 1983) (holding that one incident of offensive
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plaintiff in an offensive manner while the plaintiff was "inside a
vehicle from which there was no escape," the court found the in-
cident to amount to actionable harassment. The EEOC later
made it clear that a single, unusually severe incident of harass-
ment can create an abusive working environment, especially
where the harassment involves physical conduct. 41
The next major developments in the continuing evolution of
the law came in 1993, when the Supreme Court had occasion to
issue its second sexual harassment decision in Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc.42 The court found that the district court had ap-
plied the wrong standard by requiring sexual harassment to af-
fect the plaintiffs psychological well-being. 43 Writing for the
court, Justice O'Connor said that:
Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a
nervous breakdown. A discriminatorily abusive work environ-
ment, even one that does not seriously affect employees' psy-
chological well-being, can and often will detract from employees'
job performance, discourage employees from remaining on the
job, or keep them from advancing in their careers.44
The elimination of any requirement of psychological harm
eased a plaintiffs ability to establish a prima facie case in cir-
cuits that heretofore had required proof of psychological harm,
emotional trauma, anxiety, or psychological debilitation. 45
touching while the plaintiff was trapped inside a vehicle was sufficient to constitute
sexual harassment), affid, 726 F.2d 424 (8th Cir. 1984).
41 See EEOC, Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, 3 EEOC
Compl. Man. (BNA), N:4031, N:4046 (Mar. 19, 1990).
42 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
43 See id. at 22.
44Id.
45 See generally Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir.
1990) (requiring discrimination to detrimentally affect the plaintiff); Paroline v. Uni-
sys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 105 (4th Cir. 1989) (requiring harassment to significantly
affect the plaintiffs psychological well-being), vacated in part on rehg, 900 F.2d 27
(4th Cir. 1990); Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1561 (11th Cir.
1987) (finding that the Supreme Court's requirement of an "'abusive working envi-
ronment'... may be satisfied by a showing" of psychological harm) (citations omit-
ted); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 619 (6th Cir. 1986) (requiring sexual
harassment to seriously affect the plaintiffs psychological well-being); Scott v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 214 (7th Cir. 1986) (requiring the harassment to result
in psychological debilitation); Downes v. FAA, 775 F.2d 288, 292 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (re-
quiring that conduct "be sufficiently severe and persistent to affect seriously the psy-
chological well-being of an employee") (citation omitted).
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The Harris decision also adopted a two-pronged perspective
for viewing a hostile environment, requiring both that the victim
subjectively view the work environment as abusive, and that a
reasonable person also find it objectively abusive.46 This replaced
the various tests employed in various circuits for determining the
existence of a hostile environment.47
Finally, the issue of same-sex harassment became the next
pressing issue in the evolution of workplace sexual harassment
law, to the point that numerous courts confronted either the is-
sue or made declarations in dicta on the cognizability of same-sex
sexual harassment cases under Title VII.48 In 1995 alone, many
district courts considered the issue, with the majority accepting
the legitimacy of same-sex sexual harassment as a valid Title VII
cause of action.4 9
The purpose of this paper is to critically examine the issue of
same-sex sexual harassment, the Supreme Court's resolution of
the issue in its recent decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc.,50 and the potential impact of the interplay between
the Supreme Court's decision and the other major developments
outlined above on future litigation and employer liability for
workplace sexual harassment.
46 See 510 U.S. at 21-22.
47 Some courts have used a "reasonable person" test as in Radtke v. Everett, 501
N.W.2d 155, 166 (Mich. 1993); some have used a "reasonable woman" standard as in
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); some have used a reasonable
person of the same sex standard, as in Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 636-37
(6th Cir. 1987); and others used variations of a two-pronged standard. See generally
Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1482 (requiring the harassment to detrimentally affect the
plaintiff as well as a reasonable person of the same sex); Paroline, 879 F.2d at 105
(requiring the harassment to affect both the plaintiff and a reasonable person). See
e.g., Achampong, supra note 1, at 315-18 (discussing the potential impact of the
adoption of this two-pronged perspective).
48 See generally LAWRENCE SOLOTOFF & KARL S. KRAMER, SEXUAL
DISCRIMINATION AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 3-24.13 n.37 (1998)
(listing cases on both sides of this issue).
49 See Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, Inc., No. 94 CIV. 5458, 1995 WL 640502, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1995) (observing that fifteen district courts had addressed the
issue of same-sex harassment in 1995 alone).
50 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW:
THE POSITION BEFORE ONCALE V. SUNDOWNER OFFSHORE
SERVICES, INC.
A. Title VI's Prohibition Against Sex Discrimination and its
Legislative History
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for
an employer "to discriminate against any individual with respect
to... compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin."51 Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimina-
tion and, therefore, a violation of Title VII.
Title VII's legislative history shows that the prohibition
against sex discrimination was added by opponents of the bill in
a last-ditch effort to block the bill from becoming law.5 2 The bill,
however, passed with the amendment.5 3 The legislative history
is silent on the issue as to whether "sex" discrimination includes
"same-sex7 discrimination and, thus, sheds little or no light on
this issue. This has led courts that have considered the issue to
lean in different directions.5 4
B. The EEOCs Position on Same-Sex Sexual Harassment
According to the EEOC:
A finding of sexual harassment does not depend on the exis-
tence of any one given set of facts. Sexual harassment can occur
in a wide variety of circumstances and encompass many vari-
ables. Although the most widely recognized fact pattern is that
in which a male supervisor sexually harasses a female em-
ployee, this form of harassment is not the only one recognized
51 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
52 See 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Smith); id. at 2581-82 (re-
marks of Rep. Green).
53 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 28 Stat. 241.
4 Compare Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1505 (11th
Cir. 1997) (finding nothing in the legislative history that expressly excludes "same-
sex harassment claims from the purview of Title VII"), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1184
(1998), with Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 145 (4th Cir. 1996)
(Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (stating that interpreting the "because of... sex" lan-
guage in Title VII to prohibit same-sex harassment is to stretch the language of Title
VII).
1999]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
by the EEOC. The Commission's view of sexual harassment in-
cludes, but is not limited to, the following considerations:
(1) A man as well as a woman may be the victim of sexual
harassment, and a woman as well as a man may be the har-
asser.
(3) The victim does not have to be of the opposite sex from
the harasser. Since sexual harassment is a form of sex dis-
crimination, the crucial inquiry is whether the harasser
treats a member or members of one sex differently from
members of the other sex. The victim and the harasser may
be of the same sex where, for instance, the sexual harass-
ment is based on the victim's sex (not on the victim's sexual
preference) and the harasser does not treat employees of the
opposite sex the same way.55
The EEOC, in an example illustrating its position, states
that:
If a male supervisor of male and female employees makes un-
welcome sexual advances toward a male employee because the
employee is male but does not make similar advances toward
female employees, then the male supervisor's conduct may con-
stitute sexual harassment since the disparate treatment is
based on the male employee's sex.5 6
The EEOC makes it clear that if the harassment by a male
supervisor of a male employee is because of the male employee's
homosexuality, then the harassment is not based on the em-
ployee's gender, but on his sexual preference, and is therefore not
sexual harassment. 57
In Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.,58 the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals stated that "[allthough the courts are not
bound by the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII, it is neverthe-
less appropriate to consider the EEOC's interpretation because of
the EEOC's charge to enforce the Act."59 The EEOC's definition
of sexual harassment 6° has been adopted by the courts, and its
55 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 615.2(b) (1998) (citation omitted).
56 Id.
5' See id.
58 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996).
59 Id. at 750 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)).
6o See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1998).
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view on same-sex harassment has been referred to by courts that
have adopted its position on the issue.61
C. Judicial Attitudes Toward Same-Sex Sexual Harassment
Under Title VII
There was a split of authority amongst the federal circuit
courts and the district courts that had addressed the issue of
same-sex sexual harassment.62 One court referred to the lower
federal courts considering the issue as "hopelessly divided."63
This section undertakes an analysis and critique of the various
positions taken by the federal courts on the same-sex sexual har-
assment issue before its resolution by the Supreme Court in On-
cale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.64
1. An Analysis and Critique of the Position of Circuits Accepting
the Cognizability of All Same-Sex Harassment Claims
a. Quick v. Donaldson Co.65
In Quick, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals accepted the
actionability of all same-sex sexual harassment cases, regardless
of the motivation for the harassment. In Quick, a hostile work
environment resulted from two years of physical and verbal har-
assment of the plaintiff by co-workers. 66 The harassment in-
cluded approximately one hundred incidents of "bagging," which
is the intentional grabbing and squeezing of another person's tes-
ticles. 67 Quick complained to supervisors about the harassment
but no remedial action was taken.68 Almost two years after the
incidents began, the employer circulated a memo classifying bag-
ging as harassment, at which point the bagging apparently
61 See, e.g., Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 446 (6th Cir.
1997) (quoting EEOC Compl. Man. § 615.2(b)(3) with approval); Wrightson v. Pizza
Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138,143 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) §
615.2(b)(3) with approval).
62 See Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1506-07 (11th Cir.
1997) (detailing the split of authority), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1184 (1998).
63 McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195 n.4 (4th
Cir. 1996).
64 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
65 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996).
66 See id. at 1374.
67 Id.
68 See id. at 1375.
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ended.69 As a result of the bagging and other physical and verbal
harassment, "Quick obtained medical and psychological treat-
ment. 7 0
A United States Magistrate held that there was no evidence
that the employer had "an anti-male or predominantly female
environment," or that the bagging was sexual in nature.71 It
found the cause of the harassment to be "personal enmity or hoo-
liganism," not Quick's sex.7 2
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit agreed with the Supreme
Court that "[nleither a man nor a woman is required to run a
'gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being al-
lowed to work and make a living.' "73 In discussing the element
of membership in a protected group in making out a prima facie
case, it saw the term "sex" as meaning either "man" or "woman"
and as "bar[ring] workplace sexual harassment against women
because they are women and against men because they are
men."
74
In discussing the element of unwelcome sexual harassment,
the court said that "[tihe type of conduct that may constitute
sexual harassment includes sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual na-
ture... [, but that] [t]he harassment need not be explicitly sex-
ual in nature, though, nor have explicit sexual overtones."75 The
court further stated that "[s]ince sexual harassment can occur in
many forms, it may be evidenced by acts of physical aggression or
violence and incidents of verbal abuse."76
The court then discussed the "because of sex" requirement,
finding that the key inquiry is "whether 'members of one sex are
exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to
which members of the other sex are not exposed.' "77 It stated
that "[tihe motive behind the discrimination is not at issue be-
69 See id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 1376.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 1377 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
74 Id.
75 Id. (citations omitted).
76 Id.
77 Id. at 1378 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993)).
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cause '[ain employer could never have a legitimate reason' for
creating... a hostile work environment."78
The court rejected the district court's standard in purporting
to limit protection to only disadvantaged or vulnerable groups,
finding that Title VII "extends to all employees and prohibits
disparate treatment of an individual, man or woman, based on
that person's sex."79 The court held that "[tihe district court...
erred in requiring Quick to show evidence of an anti-male or pre-
dominantly female work environment."80
The court also found that "[tihe district court... erred in de-
termining that the challenged conduct was not of a genuine sex-
ual nature and therefore not sexual harassment... [because]
neither [the] bagging nor the physical attacks expressed sexual
interest."81 The court stated that a worker" 'need not be proposi-
tioned, touched offensively, or harassed by sexual innuendo' in
order to have been sexually harassed,"8 2 and that "physical ag-
gression, violence, or verbal abuse may amount to sexual har-
assment."8 3 It held the district court's finding that the "harass-
ment was not gender-based because.., the underlying motive
was personal enmity or hooliganism" to be erroneous, holding the
proper inquiry to be whether members of one sex are subjected to
disadvantages, terms, or conditions of employment to which
members of the other sex are not.8 4 The court found that the rec-
ord contained no incidents of bagging females, thus raising a
genuine issue as to whether the harassment was gender-based
and reversed the award of summary judgment to the employer.8 5
Dissenting, Judge Nangle stated "that the majority opinion
sets a precedent for improperly expanding Title VII to cover any
form of harassment experienced in the workplace."86 He did not
78 Id. (quoting Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316,
1326 (8th Cir. 1994)).
79 Id. (citing Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).
80 Id. This requirement was first articulated by Judge Ann C. Williams in
Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Ill. 1988), and adopted by the Fifth
Circuit in Garcia v. ElfAtochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994).
81 Quick, 90 F.3d at 1378-79.
82 Id. at 1379 (quoting Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 964-




86 Id. at 1380.
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believe that a cause of action existed under Title VII for the of-
fending conduct, or that harassment of a heterosexual male by
other male heterosexuals could create a hostile environment un-
der Title VII, although reprehensible conduct may be involved.8 7
b. A Critique of Quick: Blurring the Line Between Sexual
Harassment and Sex-Based Harassment
The Quick decision may be supported by the court's reading
of Title VII and its legislative history, which contain nothing to
suggest that its protections exclude same-sex harassment. It is
further supported by its reliance on Harris's directive to inquire
as to whether members of only one sex have been subjected to
discrimination in order to determine the "because of sex" element
in a sexual harassment claim. It appears, however, to go too far
insofar as it purports to hold that "physical aggression, violence,
or verbal abuse may amount to sexual harassment"88 without re-
quiring that such conduct be of a sexual nature.8 9 The conduct,
however, must be explicitly or implicitly sexual in order to consti-
tute sexual harassment.
As previously discussed, the EEOC definition of sexual har-
assment recognizes two forms of sexual harassment: quid pro quo
sexual harassment and hostile environment sexual harassment.90
Courts have incorporated the EEOC's definition of sexual har-
assment in fashioning the elements of a prima facie case in both
types of sexual harassment.
In quid pro quo sexual harassment, the plaintiff must estab-
lish that he was a member of a protected group, that the unwel-
come sexual conduct was based on sex, that employment condi-
tions were affected by the victim's response, and that the
employer was liable.91 In hostile environment sexual harass-
ment, the victim must establish membership in a protected
87 See id. at 1380 (citing McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72
F.3d 1191, 1195-96 (4th Cir. 1996)).
88 Id. at 1379.
89 See id. at 1377 (stating that the conduct need not be explicitly sexual nor have
explicit sexual overtones to constitute sexual harassment).
90 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
91 See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-04 (11th Cir. 1982). The
court distilled these elements from those of a prima facie case of disparate treatment
as laid down in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). See
id. at 905 n.11.
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group, unwelcome sexual conduct based on sex,92 and an effect on
employment conditions.93
The conduct complained of in a same-sex sexual harassment
case must, therefore, clearly be of a sexual nature. Grabbing and
squeezing another's testicles arguably constitutes "physical con-
duct of a sexual nature,"94 and where the acts are so severe or
pervasive as to result in a hostile environment, the legal defini-
tion of sexual harassment, has been met. Without sexual con-
tent, however, physical aggression, violence, or verbal abuse
could not be accurately characterized as sexual harassment, even
though it may qualify as sex-based harassment. The EEOC has
stated that:
Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination in which the
prohibited conduct is sexual in nature, not just sex-based. Addi-
tionally, the allegedly discriminatory conduct must fall within
the definition of sexual harassment set forth in §1604.11(a) of
the Guidelines. If the alleged discrimination does not meet one
or more of the criteria in §1604.11(a), then it is not sexual har-
assment.95
The EEOC makes clear that "[vierbal conduct-no matter
how offensive-which neither discriminates on the basis of sex
nor is sexual in nature clearly cannot be sexual harassment." 6
Also, physical conduct "must be of a sexual nature to constitute
sexual harassment."97 Thus, the Quick court's statements as to
what may constitute sexual harassment were too broad since
they blur the line between sexual harassment and sex-based
harassment of a non-sexual nature. Although sex-based harass-
ment violates Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination and is
therefore actionable, it is nonetheless not accurate to character-
ize it as sexual harassment.
9 Unwelcome sexual conduct has been defined as "sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature." Rabidue v.
Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 619 (6th Cir. 1986).
93 See id. (requiring a showing of unreasonable interference with work perform-
ance); Henson, 682 F.2d at 904 (noting that the harassment "must be sufficiently
pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working
environment").
94 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1998).
95 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 615.6(a) (1998).
95 Id. at § 615.6(a).
97 Id. at § 615.6(a)(2).
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In the same-sex context, harassment based on the perpetra-
tor's perception that the victim does not measure up to their idea
of what makes one a "male," a "man," or "masculine," or what
makes one a "female," a "woman," or "feminine," as the case may
be, ought to be seen as gender discrimination in line with the Su-
preme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,98 which
outlawed gender stereotyping. If the conduct is of a sexual na-
ture, then it is sexual harassment. If not, then it is sex-based
harassment. Thus, as the Quick court correctly stated,99 the mo-
tive for the harassment, be it sexual desire or hatred, is irrele-
vant as long as the conduct is unwelcome conduct of a sexual na-
ture that discriminates on the basis of sex.
Judge Nangle's dissenting opinion argued that where hetero-
sexual males harass another heterosexual male (or where the
conduct is female-on-female conduct), it is not because of the vic-
tim's sex.100 If the plaintiff, however, alleges that the harass-
ment is because he or she does not measure up to the perpetra-
tor's notions of masculinity or femininity, then that presents a
factual question as to whether the conduct is based on sex. In
that event, it would be inappropriate to preclude a jury from de-
ciding whether there is a cause of action as Judge Nangle
would.' 0 '
2. An Analysis and Critique of the Position of Courts Rejecting
the Cognizability of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment
a. Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America 02
The Fifth Circuit is the only circuit that outright rejected the
cognizability of same-sex sexual harassment claims under Title
VII. In Garcia, a male employee brought a Title VII action al-
leging sexual harassment by a male foreman. In reviewing the
98 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
99 See Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1378 (8th Cir. 1996).
100 Id. at 1380 (Nagle, J., dissenting) (citing with approval the decision in
McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195-96 (4th Cir.
1996)).
101 See id. at 1381 (Nagle, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]he fundamental differ-
ence between [his] dissent and the majority seems to be who should decide whether
a cause of action lies for such conduct" and asserting that it was "a question of law
for the court" to decide).
102 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
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district court's grant of summary judgment to the employer, the
Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff did not have a cause of action
under Title VII for alleged sexual assault by his supervisor.
Citing an unpublished earlier opinion, the court held that "
'[h]arassment by a male supervisor against a male subordinate
[did] not state a claim under Title VII even though the harass-
ment ha[d] sexual overtones.' "103 The court stated that "what
Locke did to Garcia could not in any event constitute sexual har-
assment within the purview of Title VII, and hence summary
judgment in favor of all defendants was proper on this basis
also."1 4 The court further cited the district court's decision in
Goluszek v. Smith,10 5 and implied that same-sex harassment was
not gender discrimination 6 Other than its references to earlier
authority, the Fifth Circuit offered no articulation of its position
on same-sex sexual harassment.
b. Blake v. City of Laredo107
The Fifth Circuit had occasion to revisit the issue of same-
sex sexual harassment in Blake. The court, however, in another
unpublished opinion, simply recognized Garcia as binding prece-
dent on the issue of same-sex sexual harassment. 08
c. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.0 9
In Oncale, the plaintiff alleged sexual harassment by his su-
pervisor and co-workers in the form of threats of homosexual
rape, restraining him and placing a penis on his neck and arm,
and pushing a bar of soap into his anus.1 0 Oncale quit his job
and brought suit alleging both quid pro quo and hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment. The district court relied on Garcia and
awarded summary judgment to the employer."' The court stated
103 Id. at 451-52 (quoting Giddens v. Shell Oil Co., 12 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 1993))
(alteration in original).
104 Id. at 452.
105 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
106 Garcia, 28 F.3d at 452.
107 58 F.3d 637 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision).
103 See id.
109 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996), overruled, 523 U.S. 75 (1998). The Supreme
Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and held that "sex discrimination consisting of
same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII." Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82.
110 See Oncale, 83 F.3d at 118-19.
111 See id. at 119.
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that it was "'compelled to find that Mr. Oncale, a male, has no
cause of action under Title VII for harassment by male co-
workers.' "112
In examining the precedential value of Garcia, the court con-
cluded that one panel of the Fifth Circuit could not overrule a
prior panel's decision even though the Garcia analysis had been
rejected by other jurisdictions. The court stated that only a deci-
sion by the court en banc or the Supreme Court could supersede a
prior panel's decision. 13 The court traced the history of same-sex
jurisprudence in the Circuit to Giddens, commenting that the
holding of that case was unclear, but that it appears to have held
"that male-on-male harassment with sexual overtones is not sex
discrimination without a showing that [the] employer treated the
plaintiff differently because of his sex." 14 The court observed
that "Garcia ... extended Giddens to bar all same-sex sexual
harassment claims," and that an earlier District Court decision
in Goluszek v. Smith"15 was in accord with this holding. 16 The
court therefore saw Garcia as binding precedent.
d. A Critique of Oncale
The Fifth Circuit in Oncale seems to have been saying that it
is not clear why it held an anomalous position on the issue of
same-sex harassment, but that its hands were tied by precedent,
and only a full panel of the court or the Supreme Court could do
anything about it. That put the Fifth Circuit's jurisprudence on
the same-sex issue at the lowest end of the scale of reasoned de-
cisions from the multiplicity of courts ruling on the issue. Fur-
ther examination of the precedents cited by the court reveals,
however, that the Goluszek decision purported to articulate a
reasoned basis for prohibiting same-sex claims under Title VII.
112 Id. (citation omitted).
113 See id. (citing Pruitt v. Levi Strauss & Co., 932 F.2d 458, 465 (5th Cir. 1991)).
114 Id. at 120; see also Giddens v. Shell Oil Co., 12 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 1993) (per
curiam) (unpublished table decision) (noting that same-sex sexual harassment is not
a viable claim under Title VII because Title VII is intended to remedy gender-based
discrimination).
115 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. ll. 1988).
116 Oncale, 83 F.3d at 120. See infra notes 117-30 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Goluszek v. Smith.
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e. Goluszek v. Smith 17
In Goluszek, the plaintiff alleged that he was sexually har-
assed by other male employees. 118 Although the court noted that
there was some evidence that the employer "reacted differently to
female claims of sexual harassment than [to] male claims," the
court found that the conduct of Goluszek's co-workers was not the
type that Title VII was designed to protect.119 Judge Ann Wil-
liams reiterated the requirement that "the plaintiff must demon-
strate that but for [his or her] sex the plaintiff would not have
been the object of harassment," and held that "the defendant's
conduct was not the type of conduct Congress intended to sanc-
tion when it enacted Title VII." 120 "The discrimination Congress
was concerned about.., is one stemming from an imbalance of
power and an abuse of that imbalance by the powerful which re-
sults in discrimination against a discrete and vulnerable
group."121 She continued to explain that "[t]he 'sexual harass-
ment' that is actionable under Title VII 'is the exploitation of a
powerful position to impose sexual demands or pressures on an
unwilling but less powerful person.' "122 She accepted the possi-
bility that the plaintiff may have been harassed because he is
male, but ruled that the harassment was not of a kind that cre-
ated an anti-male environment, and granted the defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment. 123
f. A Critique of Goluszek
Although the imbalance of power has been profferea as a
reason for the incidence of workplace sexual harassment, 124 it is
not a prerequisite thereto. To require that one be in an environ-
ment dominated by the other sex in order for sexual harassment
to be cognizable would legitimize sexual harassment by a male of
a female in a work environment that was predominantly female,
117 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Il. 1988).
118 See id. at 1453.
119 Id. at 1455-56.
120 Id. at 1456.
121 Id. (citing Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment
Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1451-52 (1984)).
122 Id.
m See id.
M See generally CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979).
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and where females held the highest positions. That, however,
would clearly be contrary to Title VII's goal to ensure a work-
place free of discrimination. It is also clear that sexual harass-
ment does not have to be directed at a group to be cognizable. It
may be directed at an individual who must be a member of a pro-
tected class. Both women and men are members of protected
classes based on the simple fact of their gender. Thus sexual
harassment of a female or a male because of their gender is ac-
tionable regardless of what gender dominates the workplace.'2
Goluszek has been criticized for relying on a law student note
that neither explored Congressional intent nor advocated the
theoretical model the court adopted. 26 The opinion was further
criticized for not reflecting the "current state of anti-
discrimination jurisprudence." 127
Yet Goluszek was highly influential in leading many courts
to hold same-sex sexual harassment to be outside the purview of
Title VII. 12 Thus, the court in Fredette v. BVP Management As-
sociates129 noted that many cases rejecting same-sex harassment
relied on Goluszek although the court found the rationale in
Goluszek to be flawed inasmuch as it purported to lay down a re-
strictive rule requiring harassment to be in a workplace domi-
nated by the opposite gender 30
12 See EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 615.2(b) (1998). The EEOC manual states
that "[a] man as well as a woman may be the victim of sexual harassment." Id. at §
615.2(b)(1). The "crucial inquiry is whether the harasser treats a member or mem-
bers of one sex differently from the members of the other sex." Id. at § 615.2(b)(3).
12 See Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, Inc., No. 94 CIV. 5458 (LAP), 1995 WL
640502, at *7 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1995) (criticizing reliance on a 1984 Harvard
Law Review student note, Note, supra note 121, to come up with the "power theory,"
as opposed to case law or legislative history).
127 Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545, 1550
(M.D. Ala. 1995) (pointing out that requiring the plaintiff to belong to a powerless
and dominated group would defeat reverse discrimination suits under Title VII).
128 The district courts in Quick v. Donaldson Co., 895 F. Supp. 1288, 1295-96
(S.D. Iowa 1995), rev'd, 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas &
Electric Co., 871 F. Supp. 822, 833-34 (D. Md. 1994), affd, 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir.
1996); Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 867 F. Supp. 790, 796 (N.D. Ind. 1994),
superseded, 887 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ind. 1995); and Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am.,
Inc., 909 F. Supp. 367, 368 (W.D.N.C. 1995), rev'd, 99 F.3d 138, 141 (4th Cir. 1996),
all relied on Goluszek in rejecting same-sex sexual harassment before being reversed
on appeal.
129 112 F.3d 1503 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1184 (1998).
130 See id. at 1509.
[73:701
SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW
3. An Analysis and Critique of the Position of Circuits Adopting
a Middle-Ground Position on Same-Sex Sexual Harassment
While some circuits take one of two extremes in either ac-
cepting131 or rejecting132 the cognizability of all same-sex sexual
harassment actions, other circuits chart a middle-ground position
where same-sex sexual harassment is actionable, but not in every
instance. This section discusses those courts that lay down the
specific criteria that must be met in order for same-sex sexual
harassment to be cognizable.
a. McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors133
In McWilliams, a male plaintiff alleged sexual harassment
and physical abuse by male supervisors and co-workers. The acts
included another worker exposing his genitals to McWilliams,
putting a broomstick to his anus, fondling him, putting a finger
in his mouth to simulate an oral sex act, and offering him money
for sex.134 No remedial action was taken in spite of his com-
plaints to two supervisors. 135 The plaintiff suffered emotional
harm and left his employment on medical leave.136
In a suit based on Title VII and other grounds, the district
court granted the employer summary judgment on the ground
that the employer had neither actual nor constructive knowledge
of the harassment. 137 The Fourth Circuit held on appeal that the
more fundamental reason for denying the claim was "that such a
claim does not lie where both the alleged harassers and the vic-
tim are heterosexuals of the same sex."138 The court noted that
none of the claims alleged that any of the harassers were homo-
sexual, 139 even though one of them, Witsman, had fondled
McWilliams, expressed love for him, and offered him money for
131 See Quick, 90 F.3d at 1379.
132 See Oncale v Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996),
rev'd, 523 U.S. 75 (1998); Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Ai., 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
133 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996).
134 See id. at 1193.
135 See id. at 1193-94. McWilliams made complaints on three occasions of non-
physical incidents involving co-workers. See id. at 1193.
136 See id. at 1194. When asked about his emotional state by a supervisor, he
"replied that he was upset about his parents' divorce, a failed relationship with a
woman, and a potential reduction in force" by his employer. Id.
137 See id.
138 Id. at 1195.
139 See id. at 1195.
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sex.14° The court emphasized that its holding was limited to het-
erosexual males in a hostile environment context, not cases of a
homosexual harasser or victim or both, or quid pro quo sexual
harassment of a male victim by a heterosexual male supervisor
who prefers a woman for particular work.141 The court reserved
decision on the issue as to whether same-sex harassment in-
volving a homosexual would be cognizable under Title VII, ob-
serving that the courts were hopelessly divided on the issue, and
that the Supreme Court had not yet addressed it.1'
The court stated that it did not believe that harassment of a
heterosexual male by other heterosexual males, or "comparable
female-on-female conduct," was harassment based on the victim's
sex.14 The court reasoned that the conduct may be "because of'
the victim's personality or conduct or the perpetrator's warped
mentality "[blut not specifically 'because of the victim's sex."144
In his dissent, Judge Michael did not believe that the plain-
tiff had to specifically allege and prove the perpetrators' homo-
sexuality.1 He felt enough facts were alleged in the record to
raise a factual issue as to whether the harassment was because
of the plaintiffs sex.1'
b. A Critique of McWilliams's Requirement of a Specific
Allegation of Homosexuality
The dissent is a better reasoned opinion, since a jury could
very well find that Witsman was harassing McWilliams "because
of' McWilliams's sex due to Witsman's "sexual interest or desire"
for him, without requiring a specific allegation of homosexuality
in addition to the factual allegations in the record. 47 Evidence of
homosexuality would be relevant in a jury trial, although to re-
quire it to be alleged could be overly burdensome on the plaintiff,
especially where the plaintiff is not sure of the motive for the
140 See id. at 1193.
141 See id. at 1195 n.4.
142 See id.
143 Id. at 1195-96.
144 Id. at 1196.
145 See id. at 1198 (stating "that Title VII is implicated whenever a person
physically abuses a co-worker for sexual satisfaction or propositions or pressures a
co-worker out of sexual interest or desire").
146 See id. at 1198-99.
147 Id. at 1198.
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harassment. A plaintiff might not want to risk a defamation
lawsuit for an untrue allegation regarding the harasser's sexual
orientation before discovery allows the plaintiff to ascertain the
same through interrogatories or a deposition. The issue should
be properly left to a jury in a case such as McWilliams.
c. A Critique of McWilliams's Misapplication of the "But For"
Test
The McWilliams's majority felt that there "ought to be a law"
prohibiting the behavior in this case, but did not believe Title VII
was that law. 148 The majority's unnecessarily narrow reading of
the "because of... sex" language of the statute denies legitimate
claims of sexual harassment in the workplace. Thus, if the con-
duct is of a sexual nature, even though motivated, not by sexual
attraction, but by a belief that the plaintiff does not measure up
to the harassers' perceptions of maleness, masculinity, or man-
hood, a claim for sexual harassment is still stated because the
discrimination is still "but for" the victim's sex.149 In Price Wa-
terhouse v. Hopkins,150 the Supreme Court found employment
practices which evaluate women based on gender stereotypes are
discriminatory and prohibited by Title VII. Where the conduct is
explicitly or implicitly devoid of sexual content, a claim for sex-
based harassment may still be stated under Title VII.151
d. Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc.152
In Wrightson, the Fourth Circuit had occasion to revisit the
issue of same-sex sexual harassment in a case involving sexual
harassment of a heterosexual male subordinate from an openly
homosexual male supervisor and five other openly homosexual
male co-workers. 153 The harassment, which was in the presence
of and within the knowledge of upper management, continued
14S Id. at 1196.
149 It is still "verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature" within the EEOC
Guidelines. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1998).
150 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989).
151 The EEOC Compliance Manual contains a discussion of sex-based harass-
ment. See EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 615.6(b) (1998).
152 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996).
153 See id. at 139. Wrightson does not allege that female and homosexual males
were not harassed by the homosexual employees. See id.
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despite Wrightson's complaints to management.154 The supervi-
sor sexually harassed the plaintiff by pressuring him to have
homosexual sex, graphically describing homosexual activity, and
touching Wrightson in "sexually provocative ways."155 Although
the manager and assistant manager warned the harassers that
their conduct violated federal law, no formal action was ever
taken.156
The district court relied on Garcia's5 7 holding that Title VII
did not recognize same-sex sexual harassment in dismissing
Wrightson's suit.5 8 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit noted that in
McWilliams it had "expressly reserved the question of whether
Title VII prohibits same-sex 'hostile work environment' harass-
ment where the perpetrator of the harassment is homosexual."' 59
The court "squarely address[ed] this issue, and h[e]ld that a
claim under Title VII for same-sex 'hostile work environment'
harassment may lie where the perpetrator of the sexual harass-
ment is homosexual. "160
The Wrightson court, unlike the trial court, found that the
statute did not require that the harasser and the victim be of dif-
ferent sexes for the harassment to be cognizable under Title
VII. 161 The court reasoned that the statute was gender neutral
and determined that it should be applied in a neutral manner.162
154 See id.
155 Id. at 139-40. Three other heterosexual male employees were similarly har-
assed by Howard. See id. at 140. The homosexual employees verbally harassed the
heterosexual male employees despite frequent objections to the conduct. See id.
156 See id. at 140-41.
157 Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 446-52 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating
that Title VII does not pertain to "[h]arassment by a male supervisor against a male
subordinate").
158 See Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 141. See generally S. Ashley Williams, Comment,
Long Overdue: The Actionability of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Claims Under Ti-
tle VII, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 895 (1998) (discussing the treatment of same-sex sexual
harassment claims under Title VII).
159 Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 141 (citing McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Su-
pervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195 n.4 (4th Cir. 1996)).
160 Id.
161 Id. at 142 (finding that the statute merely prohibited discrimination between
employers and employees based on gender).
16 See id. at 142. The Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228 (1989), recognized that Congress's intent when it enacted Title VII was "to pro-
mote hiring on the basis of job qualifications, rather than on the basis of race or
color." Id. at 243 (quoting Sen. Case and Sen Clark, 110 CONG. REC. 7247 (1964)).
The Court stated that gender cannot play any role in an employment decision, al-
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The court found no requirement that the perpetrator and the tar-
get be of different sexes in the statute's requirement that the
harassment be "because of' sex.163 The latter requirement, in the
court's opinion, is met when " 'but-for' the employee's sex, he or
she would not have been the victim of the discrimination."16 The
court found no "'logical connection' between Title VII's require-
ment that the discrimination be 'because of the employee's sex
and a requirement that a harasser and victim be of different
sexes."165 The court stated further that "the EEOC addresses the
very circumstance before us, concluding, as we do, that a claim
under Title VII may lie."166 It therefore reversed the trial court's
decision.167
e. A Critique of the Dissent in Wrightson: A Misunderstanding of
the "But For" Test
Judge Murnaghan dissented from the majority opinion, ar-
guing that including homosexual male harassment of a hetero-
sexual male under Title VII's "because of' sex provision was a
stretch of the language.168 He also argued that the result pro-
duced more discrimination because the standard failed to recog-
nize heterosexual-on-heterosexual harassment. 169 He preferred
the Garcia court's rationale because it treated all same-sex har-
assment alike by denying their cognizability.170 Judge Murna-
though a more qualified person may be hired. See id. at 244.
16 Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 142.
164 Id. The court relied on the Price Waterhouse standard for causation. See id.
at 142 n.2; Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244 (concluding that a plaintiff must show
the employer relied on sex-based considerations).
Is Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 142; see also O'Conner v. Consolidated Coin Caterers
Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311 (1996) (noting that Title VII requires at least a logical con-
nection between each element of the prima facie case and the illegal discrimination).
166 Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 143; see also Janet Castro, Redefining the Parameter of
Title VII in Accordance with Equal Protection Standards: The United States Su-
preme Court's Recognition of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment as a Form of Discrimina-
tion, 9 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 123, 150-51 (1998) (noting that courts have con-
stilted the EEOC Compliance Manual).
167 See Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 144.
16s Id. (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). In so opining the dissenting judge relies
upon the court's refusal in McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1196, "to extend [Title VII] pro-
tections beyond intentional discrimination 'because of the offended worker's 'sex! to
unmanageably broad protection." Id.
169 See Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 145.
170 See id. (stating that the statute was intended to decrease the incidence of
discrimination).
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ghan's arguments are, however, not persuasive, since Title VIIs
legislative history does not in any way suggest that same-sex
sexual harassment cannot be 'because of" sex. The answer is not
to bar all same-sex harassment in reliance on Garcia-a case
that contains laconic and perfunctory statements precluding
same-sex harassment without any cogent substantive reasons.
A better alternative is to recognize same-sex sexual harass-
ment whether it involves homosexual-on-heterosexual conduct or
heterosexual-on-heterosexual conduct, as long as the conduct is
both sexual in nature and based on the victim's gender. The lat-
ter requirement is satisfied whether the harassment is based on
sexual attraction or some form of animus because the victim does
not measure up to the harasser's perception or image of what a
man, male, woman, or female is supposed to be. If the conduct is
not sexual in nature then it is not sexual harassment. The con-
duct could, however, be actionable sex-based harassment if it is
because of the victim's sex, which would include not only sexual
attraction or desire, but also animus.
f. Yeary v. Goodwill Industries-Knoxville, Inc.7 1
In Yeary, the Sixth Circuit was faced with the issue of
"whether same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title
VII."1 72 The court rejected the defendant's argument that only
"opposite-sex" discrimination is actionable under Title VII, and
referred to the EEOC's Compliance Manual.173 The court noted
that the Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson' 74
had deferred to the interpretations promulgated by the EEOC
because of its power to enforce Title VII violations through regu-
latory action.175
The court noted that: the Eighth Circuit in Quick had taken
one extreme position of recognizing all same-sex sexual harass-
ment claims; the Fifth Circuit in Garcia176 and Oncale had taken
171 107 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 1997).
172 Id. at 444. The lower court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, but
stayed the proceedings and allowed an interlocutory appeal. See id.
173 Id. at 446 (citing Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 750 (4th
Cir. 1996)).
174 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
175 See Yeary, 107 F.3d at 446.
176 The court argued that Garcia "relied on a rather elliptical unpublished deci-
sion, providing little independent analysis" before barring all same-sex sexual har-
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the other extreme position of denying all same-sex sexual har-
assment claims; and "[tihe Fourth Circuit ha[d] taken a middle
ground, rejecting the type of same-sex sexual harassment" al-
lowed to go forward in Quick, but allowing the type of harass-
ment presented in Wrightson, which was the same scenario that
faced the court in Yeary. 177 The court did not find it necessary to
decide whether sexual affiliation-homosexuality was a prerequi-
site for actionability. The court delineated a "sexual attraction"
test, wherein the only requirement is that the proposition be the
result of sexual attraction.178
The court determined that the harasser was sexually at-
tracted to Yeary, and stated that this is essentially the same
situation that occurs when the harasser is male and the victim is
female.179 Affirming the district court, the Sixth Circuit stated
that "[consequently, we find no substantive difference between
either of those situations and that present here. While the de-
fendants are correct that same-sex sexual harassment cases may
potentially present difficult questions for a court, this case is not
one that does." 80
g. Fredette v. BVP Management Associates'8'
Finally, in Fredette, a male employee sued his employer un-
der Title VII for both hostile environment and quid pro quo sex-
ual harassment by a homosexual male supervisor. 8 2 The super-
visor made repeated propositions for sexual favors in return for
job benefits and retaliated when Fredette refused and reported
the matter to management. 18 Another male employee who sub-
mitted to the behavior obtained work-related benefits. 8 4 The
district court judge granted the defendant summary judgment
and concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact as
assment claims. Id. at 447.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 448.
179 See id. at 447-48.
180 Id. at 448.
181 112 F.3d 1503 (11th Cir. 1997).
182 See id. at 1504. The plaintiff was a waiter in the defendant's restaurant and
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to whether the harassment occurred because of his sex.l'5 The
Eleventh Circuit expressed the issue as whether "the sexual har-
assment of a male employee by a homosexual male supervisor is
actionable under Title VII."18 6
The court first examined the language of Title VII and ob-
served that the statute prohibits discrimination by an employer,
whether male or female, against any individual, whether male or
female because of the individual's sex. 8 7 The court stated that
harassment is driven by sexual attractions to the victim; sexual
orientation of the harasser is irrelevant.188 The court then ex-
amined Title VII's legislative history and found "nothing... that
suggests an express legislative intent to exclude same-sex sexual
harassment claims from the purview of Title VII." The court
noted that "[tihe obvious Congressional focus on discrimination
against women has not precluded the courts from extending the
protections of Title VII to men."8 9 The court also argued that the
"widespread acknowledgment of the viability of reverse-
discrimination claims... stands as an implicit rejection of' the
noncognizability of same-sex sexual harassment. 190
The court examined the split among various courts on the is-
sue and concluded that "the weight of the case law and the bet-
ter-reasoned cases support Fredette's claim."191 It noted that
numerous district courts had accepted the actionability of same-
185 See id. The court rejected the magistrate's recommendation that summary
judgment be denied. See id.
186 Id. (footnote omitted).
187 See id. at 1505.
188 See id.
189 Id. The court referred to the EEOC's identical position in § 615.2(b)(3) of the
Compliance Manual. See id; see also Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.
EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 681-82 (1983) (noting that Title VII protects both male and
female employees).
190 Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1506. Although the Supreme Court has never squarely
addressed the issue, it has addressed similar issues in the reverse discrimination
context. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S.
616, 619 (1987) (involving claim of reverse discrimination because a female was
promoted over a male based on her sex).
191 Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1508. The court cited with approval Yeary v. Goodwill
Industries-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 1997), Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of
Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996), and dicta in Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983,
990, n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977), Baskerville v. Culigan International Co., 50 F.3d 428,430
(7th Cir. 1995), and Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir.
1994).
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sex sexual harassment claims, 192 and that only the Fifth Circuit
had denied the cognizability of such claims. 193 The court exam-
ined Oncale and Garcia and found it difficult to accord much per-
suasive force to them because they were "accompanied by no rea-
soning whatsoever."194 The court also found that the conduct in
Garcia did not involve a homosexual supervisor soliciting sexual
favors from a male subordinate. 195
The court observed that many cases rejecting same-sex sex-
ual harassment relied on Goluszek, where the court required
same-sex sexual harassment of a male victim to create an anti-
male environment in order to be actionable. 196 It criticized
Goluszek's rationale as flawed and inconsistent with cases al-
lowing reverse-discrimination suits where the workplace is male
dominated. 197 The court held, therefore, that when "a homosex-
ual male supervisor solicits sexual favors from a male subordi-
nate and conditions work benefits or detriment on receiving such
favors," a Title VII claim can be stated.198 Fredette is a well-
reasoned case based on an extensive examination of judicial
authorities, Title ViI's language and legislative history, and the
EEOC's position on same-sex sexual harassment.
The court made it clear that it was not making actionable
sexual harassment based on sexual orientation of the victim.199
Nor was it deciding whether heterosexual male hazing and
19 See Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1508 n.10.
193 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 120 (5th Cir.
1996), rev'd, 523 U.S. 75 (1998); Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 450 (5th
Cir. 1994).
194 See Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1508 (discussing the Oncale and Garcia cases).
195 See id. It found the facts of Garcia more like those in McWilliams v. Fairfax
County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1193-94 (4th Cir. 1996). See Fredette, 112
F.3d at 1508. McWilliams dealt with sexually oriented speech but not solicitation of
sexual favors. See id.
196 See Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1509; see also Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456 (stat-
ing that a Title VII claim is only actionable where the work environment is domi-
nated by members of one gender and thus becomes hostile to the other gender).
197 See Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1509; see also Johnson, 480 U.S. 616, 631 (indicat-
ing that a Title VII claim can be stated even if the workplace is dominated by mem-
bers of your own gender); United Steel Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 198-99 (in-
volving a racial discrimination suit in which the African-American plaintiffs made
up less than 15% of the workforce).
198 Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1510.
199 See id. The EEOC has also made a distinction between the solicitation of
sexual favors by an employer or supervisor and discrimination based on one's sexual
orientation. See EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 615.2(b)(3) (1998).
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razzing because of sex was actionable under Title VII because
that issue was not before them.200 Since that issue was not be-
fore the court, any pronouncements thereon would have been
merely dicta rather than binding precedent. This paper has ar-
gued that where harassment of a heterosexual male by other het-
erosexual males is sexual in nature and based on the victim's sex,
including where, for example, the harasser takes exception to a
heterosexual male's masculinity or maleness, it is actionable
sexual harassment even if the motive is not sexual desire for the
victim. Where sexual content is missing, it is actionable as sex-
based harassment as opposed to sexual harassment.
4. A Synopsis of Circuits Pronouncing on the Cognizability of
Same-Sex Sexual Harassment in Dicta
Although not all circuits had occasion to decide squarely the
issue as to the cognizability of same-sex sexual harassment, some
had made pronouncements in dicta as to their inclination to ac-
cept the cognizability of same-sex sexual harassment under Title
VII.
As early as 1977, the D.C. Circuit in Barnes v. Costle201 indi-
cated its willingness to accept the actionability of same-sex har-
assment when it stated that:
It is no answer [to the conclusion that the harassment at bar
constituted sex discrimination] to say that a similar condition
could be imposed on a male subordinate by a heterosexual fe-
male superior, or upon a subordinate of either gender by a ho-
mosexual superior of the same gender. In each instance, the le-
gal problem would be identical to that confronting us now-the
exaction of a condition which, but for his or her sex, the em-
ployee would not have faced.202
Again, in Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co.,203 the
Third Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that a female
plaintiff had not been the victim of sex discrimination because
200 See Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1507.
201 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
202 Id. at 990 n.55. The D.C. Circuit reiterated this inclination in Bundy v. Jack-
son, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981), where it referred to its statement in Barnes and
"noted that in each instance the question is one of but-for causation[, namely,
whether] the complaining employee [would] have suffered the harassment had he or
she been of a different gender." Id. at 942 n.7 (citing Barnes, 561 F.2d at 990 n.55).
203 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
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male employees could also have been propositioned by the male
supervisor,2 4 stating that 'Title VII prohibits discrimination
against men as well as women."205 The Seventh Circuit stated in
Baskerville v. Culligan International Co. 206 that it would not "ex-
clude the possibility that sexual harassment of... men by other
men, or women by women would not also be actionable in appro-
priate cases."20 7 It stated a year later in McDonnell v. Cis-
neros,208 "that a difference in sex is not a necessary condition
of... sexual harassment,"2 9 and suggested thereafter in Doe v
Belleville21 that workplace sexual harassment is always action-
able regardless of the harasser's sex, sexual orientation, or moti-
vations.
In Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co.,211 the Ninth Circuit
said that it "[did] not rule out the possibility that both men and
women working at Showboat [might] have viable claims against
[a supervisor who abused both sexes] for sexual harassment."212
In Marrero-Rivera v. Department of Justice,213 the First Circuit
stated that:
Although the statute originally recognized and sought to combat
the realities of a work force where women were generally em-
ployees of men-creating a confluence in the work situation of
the power imbalance historically present between men and
women, and the power imbalance between employer and em-
204 See id. at 1047.
205 Id. at 1047 n.4 (citing Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 409 F.2d 775
(3rd Cir. 1969); see also Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 658 (D.D.C. 1976)
(stating that a violation of Title VII does not depend on anything "peculiar to one of
the genders" and thus would appear to be equally applicable to men or women).
2D6 50 F.3d 428 (7th Cir. 1995).
207 Id. at 430.
208 84 F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1996).
209 Id. at 260.
210 119 F.3d 563, 566 (7th Cir. 1997). The Doe case involved two brothers who
took summer jobs with the City of Belleville, Illinois. See id. They quit after only two
months because of harassment they were subjected to by male, heterosexual co-
workers. See id. The plaintiffs in this case filed suit alleging that they were sexually
harassed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See id. The district court
ruled in favor of the defendants because it reasoned that since all the parties were
heterosexual, the plaintiffs failed to make the required showing under Title VII. See
id.
211 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994).
212 Id. at 1464 (emphasis omitted).
213 36 F.3d 1089 (1st Cir. 1994) (unpublished decision) (affirming the district
court's finding that Title VII has been held to apply to same gender harassment).
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ployee-the statute has also been held to apply to same gender
sexual harassment.214
Finally, in Saulpaugh v Monroe Community Hospital,215
Judge Van Graafieland stated in a concurring opinion that
"[m]oreover, harassment is harassment regardless of whether it
is caused by a member of the same or opposite sex."216
5. Conflict Among the Districts on Same-Sex Sexual Harassment
The issue of cognizability of same-sex sexual harassment
under Title VII rose significantly in the district courts. In 1995
alone, at least 25 districts were faced with the issue.217 Although
there was deep division among, and sometimes within, the dis-
tricts,218 the greater majority of the cases favored recognizing
same-sex sexual harassment as a valid cause of action under Ti-
tle VII. 219 Although an examination of every lower court decision
on this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, a synopsis of some
of the cases on both sides of the issue reveals the depth of the di-
vision among the districts and brings to clear focus how urgent
Supreme Court resolution had become.
214 Marrero-Rivera v. Department of Justice, 800 F. Supp. 1024, 1027 (D.P.R.
1992). This was a reaffirmation of the court's earlier position as stated in Morgan v.
Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 901 F.2d 186 (1st Cir. 1990), where although a cause of
action was recognized, the court held that the appellant had failed to show a genuine
issue of material fact. See id.
215 4 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 1993).
216 Id. at 148 (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring).
217 See Renee Levay, Employment Law-EEOC v. Walden Book Co.:
Does/Should Title VII Apply to Same-Gender Sexual Harassment?, 26 U. MEM. L.
REV. 1601, 1612 (1996) (noting the numerosity of cases and the split among the
courts). See, e.g., McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Servs. Inc., 878 F. Supp. 229,
232 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (holding that Title VII is violated by same-sex sexual harass-
ment); Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545, 1549
(M.D. Ala. 1995) (stating that male plaintiff could bring Title VII claim for same-sex
sexual harassment); Nogueras v. University of P.R., 890 F. Supp. 60, 62 (D.P.R.
1995) (allowing female employees to raise same-sex sexual harassment claims
against a female supervisor).
218 See Dale Carpenter, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 37 S.
TEX. L. REV. 699, 700 (1996) (noting that district courts within the circuits were at
odds with each other). See, e.g., Ecklund v. Fuisz Tech. Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 335, 337-
39 (E.D. Va. 1995) (accepting the actionability of same-sex sexual harassment suits);
Mayo v. Kiwest Corp., 898 F. Supp. 335, 337 (E.D. Va. 1995), affd, 94 F.3d 641 (4th
Cir. 1996) (rejecting same-sex sexual harassment).
219 See Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1506 (11th Cir.
1997) (noting that the weight of the case law and the better-reasoned cases support
the viability of same-sex sexual harassment under Title VII).
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a. A Synopsis of District Court Decisions Accepting Same-Sex
Sexual Harassment
As early as 1983, in Wright v. Methodist Youth Services,220
the district court for the Northern District of Illinois accepted the
actionability of same-sex sexual harassment under Title VII in a
case involving harassment of a male subordinate by a homosex-
ual superior. Denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, the
court stated that "discrimination is sex discrimination whenever
sex is for no legitimate reason a substantial factor in the dis-
crimination."221 That same year, in Joyner v. AAA Cooper Trans-
portation,222 a plaintiff who had rebuffed the sexual advances of
his homosexual male superior and was laid off along with other
co-workers, but not recalled along with the others, was allowed to
sue for sexual harassment. The company had hired a new em-
ployee in spite of the experience, satisfactory performance, and
desire of the plaintiff to return to the company.223 The court
found a Title VII violation and ordered equitable relief including
reinstatement and back pay.224
One of the many cases in 1995225 to accept same-sex sexual
harassment as actionable under Title VII was EEOC v. Walden
Book Co., 226 where the EEOC filed a Title VII action on behalf of
the plaintiff who claimed constructive discharge from a hostile
environment resulting from sexual harassment by his homosex-
ual male supervisor. Ruling on a motion to dismiss the case on
220 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1983), afftd without op., 749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir.
1984).
221 Id. at 310 (quoting Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1981)); see
also Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
222 597 F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Ala. 1983), affd without op., 749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir.
1984).
223 See id. at 540.
2 Id. at 544-45.
225 Other cases that accepted same-sex sexual harassment in 1995 included
Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, Inc., No. 94 CIV. 5458 (LAP), 1995 WL 640502, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1995); King v. M.R. Brown, Inc., 911 F. Supp. 161, 166-67 (E.D.
Pa. 1995); Ecklund v. Fuisz Tech., 905 F. Supp. 335, 337-39 (E.D. Va. 1995);
Nogueras v. University of P.R., 890 F. Supp. 60, 62-63 (D.P.R. 1995); Griffith v. Key-
stone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133, 1135 (C.D. IMI. 1995); McCoy v. Johnson Con-
trols, 878 F. Supp. 229, 231-32 (S.D. Ga. 1995); Ryczek v. Guest Servs., Inc., 877 F.
Supp. 754, 760-61 (D.D.C. 1995). For a more exhaustive list of cases, see LAWRENCE
SOLOTOFF & MARK S. KRAMER, SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT
IN THE WORKPLACE 3-24.2 to 3-24.5 (1996).
22 885 F. Supp. 1100 (M.D. Tenn. 1995).
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the pleadings as having failed to state a valid cause of action un-
der Title VII, the court held that same-sex sexual harassment is
a valid cause of action under Title VII.227
b. A Synopsis of District Court Decisions Rejecting Same-Sex
Sexual Harassment
In 1995 alone several district courts considered and rejected
the viability of same-sex sexual harassment as a cause of action
under Title VII. These included Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services,228 Mayo v. Kiwest Corp.,229 Benekritis v. Johnson,23°
Myers v. City of El Paso,231 and Ashworth v. Roundup Co. 232 Be-
fore being reversed on appeal, the district courts in Quick,23 Fre-
dette,234 and Wrightson235 all rejected same-sex harassment as
not being a valid cause of action under Title VII.
Many of the cases that have rejected the cognizability of
same-sex sexual harassment under Title VII have principally re-
lied on the rationale of Goluszek v. Smith,238 which would only
recognize a Title VII claim where the work environment is domi-
nated by members of one gender and is hostile to the other gen-
der. The Goluszek court stated that there must be an imbalance
227 Id. at 1103-04 (holding that "[wihen a homosexual supervisor is making of-
fensive sexual advances to a subordinate of the same sex, and not doing so to em-
ployees of the opposite sex, it absolutely is a situation where, but for the subordi-
nate's sex, he would not be subjected to that treatment.").
228 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., No. CIV.A. 94-1483-T, 1995 Lexis 4119
(E.D. La. 1995).
229 898 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Va. 1995), affd 94 F.3d 641 (4th Cir. 1996).
230 882 F. Supp. 521 (D.S.C. 1995).
231 874 F. Supp. 1546 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
232 897 F. Supp. 489 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
233 Quick v. Donaldson Co., 895 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D. Iowa 1995), rev'd, 90 F.3d
1372 (8th Cir. 1996). In reversing the decision, the court of appeals stated that "har-
assment must have also affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment in or-
der to be actionable." Quick, 90 F.3d at 1378.
2m Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 905 F. Supp. 1034 (M.D. Fla. 1995),
rev'd, 112 F.3d 1503 (11th Cir. 1997). The court of appeals found a lack of legislative
history to the contrary to indicate that a person can have a valid cause of action for
same-sex sexual harassment. See id. at 1510.
= Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 909 F. Supp. 367 (W.D.N.C. 1995), rev'd,
99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996). The court of appeals stated that there was no indication
within Title VIrs legislative history to indicated that Congress did not support a
cause of action arising out of same-sex sexual harassment claims. See Wrightson, 99
F.3d at 144.
236 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
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of power and an abuse of that imbalance by the powerful, re-
sulting in discrimination against a vulnerable group.237 The exis-
tence of an imbalance of power between men and women and the
exploitation of that imbalance by men who viewed the entry of
women into the workplace as a threat has been proffered as an
explanation of the incidence of workplace sexual harassment.238
A power imbalance is, however, not a precondition for sexual
harassment.
6. The Need for Supreme Court Resolution
The hopeless division in the circuits and districts called for
Supreme Court resolution of the same-sex sexual harassment is-
sue. The division was compounded by the Supreme Court's de-
nial of certiorari in a number of cases that sought review.23 9 In
McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors,24° the
Fourth Circuit lamented that the Supreme Court had failed to
address the issue and that the lower federal courts were "hope-
lessly divided. 241 In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,242
the Fifth Circuit lamented its powerlessness to overrule its deci-
sion in Garcia stating that: "In this Circuit, one panel may not
overrule the decision, right or wrong, of a prior panel in the ab-
sence of an intervening contrary or superseding decision by the
court en banc or the Supreme Court."243 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to consider whether the Fifth Circuit erred and
whether male on male sexual harassment claims are actionable
under Title ViI's prohibition against " 'discriminat[ion] ... be-
cause of... sex.' "244
237 See id. at 1456. Other decisions influenced by Goluszek were Vandeventer v.
Wabash Nat' Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ind. 1995), and Fleenor v. Hewitt Soap
Co., 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1625 (S.D. Ohio 1994), affd on other grounds,
81 F.3d 48 (6th Cir. 1996).
238 See MACKINNON, supra note 124.
239 See Saulpaugh v. Monroe Comm. Hosp., 4 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 1993); Steiner v.
Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1995); Fleenor v. Hewitt Soap Co.,
81 F.3d 48 (6th Cir. 1996).
240 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996).
2A1 Id. at 1195 n.4.
242 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
23 Id. at 119.
2A4 Oncale v. Sundowners Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)).
1999]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
In recommending a solution to the impasse in the federal
courts on the same-sex sexual harassment issue, some commen-
tators proposed that courts focus on the alleged conduct and its
effect, as opposed to causation.245 Others suggested that courts
focus on the alleged misconduct "before applying the but for" test,
and that "sex" be interpreted to mean "sex-related" as opposed to
"gender."246 Skeptical of Supreme Court resolution, one author
advocated a legislative solution.24 7
III. SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE OF SAME-SEX
SEXUAL HARASSMENT: ONCALE REVISITED
A. Same-Sex Sexual Harassment is Actionable
In reviewing the Fifth Circuit's decision in Oncale, the Su-
preme Court finally resolved the issue of the actionability of
same-sex sexual harassment under Title VII. Writing for a
unanimous court, Justice Scalia stated that "[i]f our precedents
leave any doubt on the question, we hold today that nothing in
Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination 'because of...
sex' merely because the plaintiff and the defendant (or the person
charged with acting on behalf of the defendant) are of the same
sex."248 Justice Scalia further stated that "[wie see no justifica-
tion in the statutory language of our precedents for a categorical
rule excluding same-sex harassment claims from the coverage of
Title VII."249
245 See Pamela J. Papish, Homosexual Harassment or Heterosexual Horseplay?
The False Dichotomy of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Law, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 201, 232 (1996) (stating that the effect of the harassment on the victim's ability
to perform his or her work-related responsibilities is a critical area of inquiry) (citing
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986))).
246 See Regina L. Stone-Harris, Same-Sex Harassment-The Next Step in the
Evolution of Sexual Harassment Law Under Title VII, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 269, 311-
12 (1996).
247 See id. at 315-24 (advocating passage of the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act first introduced to Congress in 1994); see also Samuel A. Marcos-
son, Harassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: A Claim of Sex Discrimination
Under Title VII, 81 GEO. L.J. 1, 9 (1992) (arguing that a legislative amendment to
Title VII is necessary to change, "the firmly established distinction between sexual
orientation discrimination and sex discrimination").
248 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79 (omission in original).
29 Id.
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The Court refused to read into the statute any legislative in-
tent that would bar same-sex harassment claims. The Court
stated that "[olur holding that this includes sexual harassment
must extend to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the
statutory requirements."250
B. The Harassment Must Be Because of Sex
Addressing concerns that holding same-sex sexual harass-
ment cognizable under Title VII would risk transforming the
statute into a civility code, the Court argued that careful atten-
tion to the requirements of the statute would adequately meet
that risk.251 The Court defined the parameters of its holding by
pointing out that Title VII does not prohibit all verbal and physi-
cal harassment in the workplace; it is directed only at discrimi-
nation "because of sex."252 Mere sexual content in workplace
harassment does not automatically render it discriminatory. 53
Justice Scalia cited the Court's earlier decision in Harris v. Fork-
lift Systems, Inc.,25 4 and stated that " '[the critical issue, Title
vIrs text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to
disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which
members of the other sex are not exposed.' "255
The Court reiterated its position in Meritor and Harris to the
effect that Title VII does not reach innocuous differences in the
ways men and women routinely interact with members of the
same sex and of the opposite sex; instead, it forbids only behavior
that is so objectively offensive as to alter the conditions of the vic-
tim's employment.2 6 The conduct must be severe or pervasive
enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive working envi-
ronment.257 Thus, "ordinary socializing in the workplace [in the
form of] male-on-male horseplay or intersexual flirtation" does
not constitute actionable sexual harassment under Title VII.258




254 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
255 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 25).
256 See id. at 81.
257 See id.
25 Id. at 81-82 (stating that a court evaluating the totality of the circumstances
must distinguish actionable harassment and "simple teasing or roughhousing among
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The Court also reiterated the need to view the situation for
the objective severity of the harassment from the perspective of a
reasonable person in the plaintiffs position.259 The Court pointed
out that the social context of the harassment must also be care-
fully considered so that the difference between the harmless
smacking of the buttocks of a professional football player by his
coach as he goes onto the field, and the potential actionability of
the same conduct directed toward a secretary of either sex in the
office can be distinguished.260
Unlike the Fourth Circuit, which would recognize only same-
sex sexual harassment cases motivated by sexual desire, 261 the
Supreme Court adopted the position of the Seventh 262 and
Eighth 263 Circuits by stating that harassing conduct need not be
motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of "discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex."264 Citing an example of a situation
that might constitute discrimination "because of sex," the Court
alluded to the possibility of a female victim who is harassed in
sex-specific and derogatory terms by another woman so as "to
make it clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility
to the presence of women in the workplace."265 In any event, the
plaintiff must prove that the discrimination was "because of
sex" 266
members of the same sex").
259 See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81 (citing Harris, 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)).
260 See id.
261 See Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 144 (4th Cir. 1996)
(holding that a cause of action exists under Title VII for an employee who is targeted
for sexual harassment by a homosexual); McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Su-
pervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating that one of the elements that a
plaintiff must establish in claiming sexual harassment is that the harassment be
based on sex) (relying on Swentek v. U.S. Air., 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 1987)).
262 See Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 574 (7th Cir. 1997) (suggesting
that workplace sexual harassment is always actionable regardless of the harasser's
sex, sexual orientation, or motivations).
263 See Quick v. Donaldson, 90 F.3d 1372, 1378 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that the
motive behind the discrimination is irrelevant because " '[ain employer could never
have a legitimate reason' for creating or permitting a hostile work environment")
(quoting Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1326 (8th
Cir. 1994)).
264 Oncale, 523 U.S.-at 80.
2 Id. The court also noted that "[a] same-sex harassment plaintiff may also...
offer direct comparative evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of
both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace." Id. at 80-81.
266 Id. at 81 (stating that the proper standard is "because of... sex").
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C. A Critique of the Supreme Court's Decision
Although the Supreme Court correctly held that same-sex
sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII, the Court's de-
lineation of the parameters of the critical phrase-"because of
sex"-leaves much to be desired. Its lack of sufficient specificity
leaves lower courts with an unclear standard in applying the test
to same-sex sexual harassment cases. The Court's opinion is
rather general in its guidance of lower courts. The Court, how-
ever, clearly articulates that not all offensive conduct is sexual
harassment, pointing out that the conduct must rise to the level
of discrimination because of the victim's gender.267
The Court did not address the all-important question of
whether same-sex sexual harassment, based on the harasser's
perception that the victim does not meet the harasser's stereo-
typical view of femininity or masculinity, constitutes discrimina-
tion "because of sex."268 Apart from the Fifth Circuit, no other
circuit had a problem finding that same-sex sexual harassment
based on sexual desire was actionable.269 Thus, the Court did not
provide the necessary guidance in an area where the circuits
were grasping for answers to the question of whether and when
same-sex sexual harassment that is not motivated by sexual de-
sire could be found to constitute sexual discrimination under Ti-
tle VII.
The Court's rather general example involving the unlikely
event that a woman with a general hostility toward women in the
workplace, harassed another woman in sex-specific and deroga-
tory terms, sheds little light on the issue. Would a female super-
visor who subjected another female subordinate in the workplace
to demeaning sexual taunts and rumors because of a perceived
threat to her future advancement, where management has ex-
pressed a desire to promote the female subordinate to an execu-
tive position in the future, have engaged in illegal sex discrimi-
267 See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81 (1998) (discussing the "because of... sex burden
that a plaintiff must meet).
2ms Id. The harassment in McWilliams and Goluszek appear to have been moti-
vated by the harassers' stereotypical attitudes about masculinity. The principle of
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989), outlawing discrimination
based on gender stereotypes appears applicable here as well.
29 See Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 571 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that
the Fifth Circuit is the only circuit to hold that male-on-male sexual harassment is
not actionable under Title VID.
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nation if a hostile environment results? Would the fact that the
hostility is not generally directed toward females in the work-
place, as Justice Scalia suggests,270 but only toward a specific fe-
male, preclude actionability under Title VII?
The Supreme Court's directive to courts and juries is simply
not enough. To use "[clommon sense, and an appropriate sensi-
tivity to social context... to distinguish between simple teasing
or roughhousing among members of the same sex, and conduct
which a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position would find
severely hostile or abusive"271 fails to give sufficient guidance.
What a harasser regards as simple roughhousing may be viewed
by a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position as having cre-
ated a hostile work environment. The Court's test fails in this
regard by laying down a general guideline containing both stan-
dards as if they are mutually exclusive. The Court did not ad-
dress the Eighth Circuit's analysis of Title VII, which appeared
to lay down the rather broad principle that physical aggression,
violence, or verbal abuse may amount to sexual harassment
without specifically requiring the behavior to have sexual con-
tent.272 Although the Court seems to indirectly address this issue
by specifically mentioning "sex-specific and derogatory terms"
and requiring more than conduct that is "merely tinged with of-
fensive sexual connotations,"273 it is lamentable that the Court
did not provide sufficient specificity in its opinion to guide lower
courts in their application of the heretofore elusive "because of
sex" standard. In doing so the Court has failed to provide the
lower courts with the tools to avoid the illogical results, seen in
the divergent positions on the issue, that existed before the Su-
preme Court's decision.
IV. POTENTIAL IMPACT OF ONCALE ON FUTURE SEXUAL
HARASSMENT LITIGATION
In the years preceding the Supreme Court's decision in On-
cale, more than forty courts had addressed the question of same-
sex sexual harassment either squarely or in dicta.274 A number
270 See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
271 Id. at 82.
272 See Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1379 (8th Cir. 1996).
273 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-81.
274 See Stone-Harris, supra note 246, at 277 n.45 (listing numerous cases that
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of these courts rejected the cognizability of same-sex sexual har-
assment under Title VII.275 Thus, the Oncale decision legitimizes
same-sex sexual harassment actions in jurisdictions that previ-
ously rejected their viability under Title VII.
With the increased awareness of sexual harassment, begin-
ning with the Senate confirmation hearings after Clarence Tho-
mas was nominated to the Supreme Court,276 and culminating
with the sexual harassment lawsuit filed by Paula Jones against
the President of the United States,277 as well as the astronomical
rise in sexual harassment lawsuits since 1991,278 the likely result
of the Oncale decision is to add fuel to the ongoing drive to elimi-
nate discriminatory harassment from the American workplace.
In 1991, 6,892 sexual harassment suits were filed nationwide.279
In 1993, just two years after the confirmation hearings, 12,537
suits were filed.280 An estimated 15,000 sexual harassment cases
were filed in 1996,281 and the estimate for 1998 is 15,618.282 on-
cale sends a signal that the Supreme Court is committed to
eliminating workplace sexual harassment, which will likely re-
sult in increased confidence on the part of victims of sexual har-
assment to avail themselves of Title VII remedies.
Although some commentators do not see the Supreme Court
decision in Oncale as creating major new liabilities, others recog-
nize that it could result in increased litigation if employers do not
have addressed this issue in some way since 1994).
275 See Fleenor v. Hewitt Soap Co., 81 F.3d 48, 49-51 (6th Cir. 1996); Garcia v.
Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994); Mayo v. Kiwest Corp., 898
F. Supp. 335, 337-38 (E.D. Va. 1995), affd, 94 F.3d 641 (4th Cir. 1996); Ashworth v.
Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489, 494 (W.D. Wash. 1995); Benekritis v. Johnson, 882
F. Supp. 521, 526 (D.S.C. 1995); Myers v. City of El Paso, 874 F. Supp. 1546, 1548
(W.D. Tex. 1995); Vandeventer v. Wabash Natl Corp., 867 F. Supp. 790, 796 (N.D.
Ind. 1994); Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. IIl. 1988); see also
Stone-Harris, supra note 246, at 279 n.52 and accompanying text.
26 See Mark Hansen, The Next Litigation Frontier? Claims Against Employers
for Third Party Harassment on the Rise, 79 A.B.A. J., Sept. 1993, at 26.
= Paula Jones' sexual harassment claim was dismissed by Judge Susan Web-
ber Wright on a summary judgment motion. See Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657
(E.D. Ark. 1998).
278 See Tony Mauro, Court Clears Air on Sexual Harassment, USA TODAY, Nov.
10, 1993, at Al (stating that the number of complaints doubled from 1991 to 1993).
279 See id.
280 See id.
281 See NBC's World News Tonight (NBC television broadcast, Oct. 20, 1997).
2=2 See Sexual Harassment Charges and Dismissals Escalate, 76 HR FOCUS 4
(Apr. 1, 1999).
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take satisfactory remedial measures. 283 Admittedly, liability for
same-sex sexual harassment is not new.2 Its recognition in
every jurisdiction, however, will likely increase employer liabil-
ity. This potential increase in employer liability becomes more
evident when viewed against the backdrop of other significant re-
cent developments in workplace sexual harassment law, and the
combined effect of these developments are weighed.285
First, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,286 the Supreme
Court held that a sexual harassment plaintiff need not establish
psychological harm to make out a prima facie case of hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment. Thus, although a plaintiff suing for
same-sex sexual harassment on a hostile environment theory
must prove that the behavior was "so objectively offensive [that
it] alter[ed] the 'conditions' of the victim's employment,"28 7 an
employer may not defeat the plaintiffs case simply because the
harassment did not affect the plaintiffs psyche. 288
Second, a same-sex sexual harassment action may be filed by
an employee because of the actions of a third party or non-
employee, thus potentially increasing employer liability. 8 9 Re-
cently, it was reported that many employers were unaware of the
potential liability for third-party harassment, and that such
2 3 See Mark A. Hoffman & Michael Prince, Same-Sex Harassment Liability Un-
likely to Rise, 32 Bus. INs. 2, 10 (Mar. 9, 1998).
284 See generally supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
285 See generally Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harass-
ment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169, 1194-99 (1998); Jeffrey A. Gettle, Note, Sexual
Harassment and the Reasonable Woman Standard: Is it a Viable Solution?, 31 DUQ.
L. REV. 841, 841-49 (1993).
85 510 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1993).
287 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
288 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22-23.
289 See, e.g., Magnuson v. Peak Technical Servs., 808 F. Supp. 500, 507-08 (E.D.
Va. 1992) (stating that the definition of employer has been expanded by the courts),
affd, 40 F.3d 1244 (1994); EEOC v. Newton Inn Assocs., 647 F. Supp. 957, 958-60
(E.D. Va. 1986) (finding the employer liable for sexual harassment by customers);
Priest v. Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571, 582 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (finding that the defendant
sexually harassed the plaintiff in his capacity as an employer and as a customer in
his employment); EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(stating that "employer" includes not just those in a conventional sense, but those
who control employment).
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claims were on the rise.29° Some predicted that litigation in this
area would become a raging torrent in the near future.
291
A third development, whose potential interplay with same-
sex sexual harassment is likely to increase plaintiffs' recoveries,
involves the courts' recognition that one single event may be suf-
ficient to create a hostile environment. Thus, one single incident,
if serious enough, may ground a same-sex sexual harassment
suit resulting from the actions of a supervisor, co-worker, or non-
employee.292
Finally, the ability of a sexual harassment plaintiff to re-
cover monetary damages by virtue of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
further exacerbates potential employer liability for same-sex sex-
ual harassment. 293 A same-sex sexual harassment plaintiff may
recover up to $300,000 in compensatory and punitive damages
for intentional discrimination, depending on the size of the em-
ployer.294 The damages may be for future "pecuniary losses, emo-
tional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of en-
joyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses,"295 as well as
reasonable attorney's fees and expert fees.296 The statutory caps
do not apply to back pay, front pay, interest, past pecuniary
losses, or other Title VII relief.297
With legal fees included, the average cost of liability for sex-
ual harassment was estimated to be $600,000 in 1994, and the
29 See Hansen, supra note 276, at 26 (stating that many employers are unaware
that they may be liable for the actions of a customer or a third party).
29 See id. (stating that the number of complaints are rising and employers who
fail to protect their employees are at risk).
292 See Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1189 (7th Cir. 1986) (stat-
ing that "[a] single act of a sufficiently high-ranking policy maker is sufficient to es-
tablish an entity's policy or custom" to create actionable sexual harassment); see also
Gilardi v. Schroeder, 672 F. Supp. 1043, 1046-47 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (finding that the
actions of a male employee toward a female employee constituted sexual harass-
ment), affd, 833 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1987); Barrett v. Omaha Natl Bank, 584 F.
Supp. 22, 23 (D. Neb. 1983), affid, 726 F.2d 424 (8th Cir. 1984) (stating that the piv-
otal actor in the harassment was an employee).
29 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994).
294 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). Up to $50,000 may be recovered from an em-
ployer with 15 to 100 employees; up to $100,000 from employers with 101 to 200 em-
ployees; up to $200,000 from employers with 201 to 500 employees; and up to
$300,000 from employers with more than 500 employees. See id.
295 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).
29 See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994).
297 See generally William J. Martinez & Kathleen M. Flynn, Damage Caps Un-
der the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 27 COLO. LAW. 65 (1998).
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1991 Act was believed to have been responsible for the increase
from previous years.298 The proposed Equal Remedies Act of
1997 would potentially further exacerbate employer liability for
same-sex sexual harassment inasmuch as it proposes to elimi-
nate the caps imposed by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 on recov-
eries for sex discrimination.299
Evidencing the unrelenting push to rid the workplace of dis-
criminatory harassment, Oncale will spur employers to take
more serious steps to institute effective anti-harassment policies
and complaint procedures. Another likely effect of the decision,
as the costs of sexual harassment litigation increase, is an in-
creased use of alternative dispute resolution to reduce costs. 3°°
The EEOC, in recently proposed amendments to its regula-
tions dealing with federal sector equal employment opportunity,
will require "that agencies establish or make available alterna-
tive dispute resolution programs during the EEO[C] pre-
complaint process."30 1 The program would supplement the provi-
sions in the current regulation that encourage the use of alterna-
tive dispute resolution at all stages of the complaint process.30 2
Finally, Oncale is likely to increase employer interest in Em-
ployment Practices Liability Insurance specifically designed to
cover liability for sexual harassment. These policies are a recent
product of the insurance marketplace, and are sold either as
separate policies or as an endorsement to an existing policy, such
as a Directors' and Officers' Liability Policy.303
298 See Michael Schachner, Reducing Harassment Exposure Ruling Offers Har-
assment Defense, 28 BUS. INS. 3, 56 (July 4, 1994). The average sexual harassment
jury verdict between 1988 and 1992 was estimated at $181,847. See Christine Wool-
sey, Employers Review Harassment Policies, 27 BUS. INS. 1, 4 (Nov. 15, 1993).
299 See S. 516, 105th Cong. (1997). The bill was introduced by Senator Edward
Kennedy on April 7, 1997. It was read twice and referred to the Committee on Labor
and Human Resources.
300 See Sally Roberts, Resolving to Cut Litigation Costs; Employers are Turning
to ADR for Workplace Disputes, 29 BUS. INS. 1, 1 (May 1995) (asserting that more
employers are considering alternative dispute resolution to resolve disputes). Some
companies reported dramatic reductions in litigation expenses since instituting al-
ternative dispute resolution procedures in employment contracts. See id.
301 Federal Sector Equal Employment Opportunity, 63 Fed. Reg. 8594 (1998) (to
be codified at 29 CFR pt. 1614).
302 See id.
303 See Robert A. Machson & Joseph P. Monteleone, Insurance Coverage for
Wrongful Employment Practices Claims under Various Liability Policies, 49 BUS.
LAW. 689, 711-13 (1994) (discussing the emergence of this new type of insurance).
[73:701
SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's recognition of the cognizability of
same-sex sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 is a logical step in the continuing evolution of work-
place sexual harassment law. Although the decision lacks speci-
ficity on the application of the elusive "because of sex" standard
in same-sex sexual harassment cases, it lays the necessary foun-
dation for lower courts to define the parameters of the law on
same-sex sexual harassment. The combined interplay of the On-
cale decision and other major recent developments in sexual har-
assment law exacerbates potential employer liability in this
quickly evolving area of employment law. The decision is likely
to heighten employer efforts to combat the incidence of discrimi-
natory harassment in the workplace. It is also likely to generate
more employer interest in available risk management techniques
to reduce and finance the costs of workplace sexual harassment
litigation.
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